Of Soviet Backlashes.
Sihanoukville, Cambodia, August 9th, 2014
Salaroche


The two world wars of the 20th century can be said to have been one prolonged single conflict with a short truce in between; thus the interwar period would have basically represented just enough time for Germany to recoup forces and increase their resolve to show their mettle to the world. Once the Treaty of Versailles was signed, thereby dropping down the curtain on the first act, the stage for the second was set.

Versailles imposed humiliating dictates on Germany, including financial reparations that generated a hyperinflation of a magnitude the world had probably never seen before nor might it ever see again. More slighting still, allied resolutions were deliberated and adopted in forums where Germany didn’t have a say nor held any bargaining chips. German Territories were arbitrarily given back to France and Belgium, and to the newly created country of Poland, and Germany was told not to pursue any unification designs with Austria.

The Treaty of Versailles clearly reduced Germany’s territories thereby reducing its natural resources too, but the light that Versailles dimmed the most over that land was that of national pride. Over the decade ensuing the signing of the treaty, the feeling of humiliation proved to be much more corroding to the German psyche than whatever other punishment the Allies might have imposed on the country. It was only in restoring their love of the fatherland that the Germans managed to get back on their feet again. From the perspective of time, therefore, WWII looks like the natural prolongation of WWI. 

In contrast, the Soviet Empire went down rather quietly and uneventfully. There were no treaties needed to bring that global struggle to a close. Aside from some proxy armed conflicts in the third world, the Cold War was mostly an ideological confrontation, so that when the communist ideology finally met its demise there was no need for Western powers to impose sanctions on, nor demand financial reparations from, the USSR.

In turn, the Empire’s successor, Russia, did suffer territorial losses far larger than those suffered by the Germans after WWI. In all, 15 new countries have thus far sprung from the former USSR, and some others are still trying to escape from the Russian sphere of influence. Think of Ukraine as an example of the latter.

The real big difference between the German and the Russian territorial reductions resides in whether those territories were arbitrarily reassigned by foreign powers to other political entities or whether they attained independence by themselves driven by local popular movements.  Think of the Baltic States as examples of the latter.

No doubt the light of Russian national pride has dimmed considerably since 1992, although definitely not to a degree similar to that of Germany after 1918. The reasons for the dimming of that light are different as well. The former USSR continues to disintegrate not because of rules dictated by overpowering external forces, but because of the legacy of the defunct communist ideology. Germans had living political forces they could point their fingers at as culprits for their troubles, but up to now there was no tangible evidence for the Russians to adopt any such stance.

Obviously the Russians are presently hurting in their national pride, otherwise there wouldn’t be 82 per cent of the population supporting Vladimir Putin in his expansionist ambitions. In the view of a good majority of Russians, what seems to matter is to have Russia inspiring fear around its borders and beyond again, thereby headlining the news all over the world, regardless of whether the news are good or bad for the country in the long run.

If history is right, such blind nationalistic adventures don’t usually end well for countries that engage in it. Think of 20th century Germany, Italy, and Japan as clear examples of it. But mental states involving extreme fervor of the nationalistic, ideological, or religious kind may easily be likened to lobotomized minds where important sections of the thinking process have been excised, thereby allowing only for partial and prejudiced perceptions of reality, which in turn only reaffirm and increase the fervor in question.

Love of nation can often be a good thing, but taking such love to extreme lengths usually means stepping on slippery slopes, just check out the regrettable burden the American people threw on their shoulders by blindly following the G. W. Bush administration into Iraq. For one, Bush’s first term represents one of the most shameful periods in American journalism as, swept in the wave of irrational patriotism roiling the land, all major news outlets cowardly resorted to following the official pro-war line, while all significant voices of dissent were either silenced through character assassination or cowed into submission.  

Fortunately, however, that was only one of a few such transitory periods in American history. As de Tocqueville observed a couple of centuries ago, there may be some anti-democratic bumps along the way in America’s evolutionary path, but the idea of individual freedom and egalitarianism will always win the day in the long run, which is part of what some of us call the time-tested resilience of American ideals.

Russia, however, is a much different case. Russians don’t have any Democratic traditions to fall back to once a domestic political crisis has receded.  What will the Russians find beneath the present patriotic veneer once their nationalistic fervor subsides? Not much else but the same remnants of authoritarianism and corruption they inherited from the Soviet Union.

Resentment doesn’t seem to be a practical motivation on which to base plans and actions. For some reason, a resentful mind is quite inadequate for perceiving reality in a clear manner, particularly as it usually fails to properly assess the consequences of its decisions. Presently, the Russian people seem to be following Putin’s lead based on their resentment of the West, even as the West never imposed any sanctions on them after the fall of the Soviet Empire.

Germany can be said to have had reasons to resent the Allies for imposing such exacting punitive measures on them after WWI, but Russia didn’t suffer any corresponding humiliating impositions from the part of any other country after 1992, when the USSR “officially” collapsed. Western sanctions started raining on Russia only from the moment they annexed Crimea in March of 2014, not one single day before.

And what could the Russians be resentful of anyway? What can all that animosity against the West be all about? Any answer you can think of ends up being related to national pride. Soviet times were hard times for the Russian people, but everyone knew they were one of the two major powers in the world and were aware of the importance the US attached to every single one of their government’s movements. In contrast, up to the annexation of Crimea, Russia had been relegated to a second-rate nuclear power status unworthy of America’s geopolitical concerns. That must have hurt the national feelings of old Soviet elites a la Putin very bad.

Then there’s the question of Russian Authoritarianism. The father figure is central to the Authoritarian scheme, but it requires a counterpart to exist. For the Authoritarian order to succeed, the one who needs to dominate necessitates someone who needs to be dominated, or at least acquiesces to it. Tsarist Authoritarianism collapsed when the Russian people no longer saw a benevolent father figure in the Tsar. Similarly, Soviet Authoritarianism broke down when the Politburo exhausted its ability to fool the people so that, in the end, the glaring disastrous Soviet reality allowed the population to see through the blatant decades-old lies behind the party’s propaganda.

21st century Russia has also had a disappointing awakening. The spirit of Democracy was never part of their sociopolitical infrastructure, so that the hope of Russia becoming a Democratic country was never really alive. Consequently, the corrupt hierarchical government structures of the past never actually disappeared, they just metamorphosed in the form of the present dominant oligarchies.

As the West kept going forward with technological, social, and cultural advances and Russia remained stagnant in those fields, Russian malaise kept growing. China’s rise only came to exacerbate such malaise. In taking the position of second economic power in the world and in increasingly reasserting its territorial claims in the South China Sea, China became some sort of envy to many Russians. Of the two remaining major representatives of the deceased Communist ideology only one was succeeding, and it was not Russia. China was making a rather smooth effective transition to capitalist modes of production while Russia was stuck largely depending on its natural resources to subsist.

Such news was a bit troubling to the Russian population and, all along, Russian elites were aware of the possible political ramifications emanating from popular discontent, particularly those of the dire kind. What could they do to divert culpability elsewhere? Who could they blame for their own incompetence and structural corruption? Western moral decadence seemed a good candidate for the scapegoat role, so they went for it and thus far it has worked.

The Pussy Riot incident was a bellwether regarding the Russian people’s desire for further government control. The way many among the younger Russian generations sided with the government in silencing and jailing those young women was very telling as to the direction the people wanted the government to go. Putin’s tirades and legislations against gay people was the next step and pinning it all on western debauchery was the one before last.

Irredentism was the latest one, and thus far it has also worked well. The annexation of Crimea was widely applauded in Russia and, according to some statistics, 52 per cent of the population presently favors invading Ukraine. Where is all this leading to nobody really knows, but as the situation stands today Russia keeps isolating itself to extents that soon may start affecting the daily life of common Russians, which might end up producing effects diametrically opposed to those the Putin clique was initially looking for.

If history is correct, military, political, and economic backlashes based on resentment for self-inflicted wounds don’t ever seem to produce convenient results. At this point in time it would be difficult to assess exactly what calculations have brought the Putin gang to engage in the uncertain adventures they have embarked their country on, but whatever those calculations were, the future doesn’t look too bright ahead for Russia.


Salaroche